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No. 7667 
APPELLANTS• BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a judgment in the District 
Court of Davis County, State of Utah, rendered by Hon-
orable Charles G. Cowley, Judge. Throughout this brief 
the parties will be referred to as plaintiffs and defend-
ants as they were in the trial court. 
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On May 27th, 1949, the plaintiffs filed an action 
against the above named defendants, and also included 
Chester R. Ashby and Clara E. Ashby as parties defend-
ant. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case, however, 
the action was dismissed as to the latter, and no appeal 
has been taken from the dismissal. 
In their complaint the plaintiffs allege ownership of 
the following described real estate in Davis County, State 
of Utah: 
A part of the Southwest Quarter of the Southwest 
Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 2 
West, Salt Lake Meridan, U.S. Survey: Beginning at 
a point 10 rods and 7 feet, more or less, East from 
the Southwest corner of said quarter section, being 
9 feet West of a certain cement well, and running 
then North 3 rods, thence East 1 rod, then South 
¥2 rod, thence East 49 rods, more or less, to the end 
of the pipe line, thence South 2¥2 rods, more or 
less, thence West 50 rods, more or less, to the place 
of beginning. 
Together with the right of way over a strip of land 
¥2 rod wide adjoining the above described tract of 
land and said pipe line on the North, subject, how-
ever, to a right of way for road purposes across the 
above described premises. 
Plaintiffs base their title upon a certain deed exe-
cuted and delivered by John Traugott and wife to James 
G. Wood, a copy of which is attached to plaintiffs' com-
plaint as Exhibit A, and a certified copy of which is in 
evidence a.s plaintiffs' Exhibit B. 
The deed in question, in addition to the foregoing 
description, contains the following provisions: 
( 1) ''In case of repairs to said pipeline by the 
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Grantee herein, work must be completed in a reasonable 
length of time.'' 
( 2) •' There is also conveyed with said land all of 
the right and title to all waters, drainage or springs 
from the South half of the Southwest Quarter of Section 
36, the said Grantor, his successors and assigns grantee-
ing full protection to said pipeline from trees, shrubery 
or willows or anything that would hinder or obstruct the 
free flow of water in same, also full protection from 
barns, corals, outhouses or filth of any kind that would 
1nake the water unfit for culinary purposes.'' 
The plaintiffs also allege in their complaint that they 
and their predecessors in interest have been in adverse 
possession of the property since February 6th, 1907, and 
have continually paid taxes thereon. They further allege 
that the property in question was purchased, and has 
been maintained, for the purpose of obtaining water 
therefrom, and allege that the defendants have been 
guilty of acts tending to pollute the water supply. 
The plaintiffs further allege that they attempted to 
build a fence along the North side of the pipeline, and 
that the defendants have torn down the fence and con-
tinued to cross the land claimed by the plaintiffs. 
To get in mind the true picture, it is essential to un-
derstand the location of the land in question and its im-
portance to the defendants. 
It will be observed from the deed, Exhibit A, and 
from the description hereinbefore set forth that the 
strip of land specifically in controversy is about 2¥2 rods 
in width and about 50 rods in length. However, the 
court found (Findings page 4, paragraph 1) that part 
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of the said 2lf2 rods is contained in a public highway. As 
a matter of fact, the tract of land particularly involved 
in this dispute is only about one rod in width after the 
part in the highway is deducted. That rod lies between 
the pipeline referred to and a public ditch on the South 
extending East and West along the North boundary of 
the public highway. Immediately North of, or rather 
included within the North margin of this one rod, is a 
drain pipe, installed by the predecessors of the plaintiffs 
to catch underground drainage water which is collected 
in a small cistern and piped some distance to the pren1ises 
of the plaintiffs. This drainage pipe lies under the sur-
face of the ground at depths varying from ten feet to 
twenty-five feet (TR 63). It is conceded by the plaintiffs 
that the use of this strip of land for right of way pur-
poses does not in any way interfere with plaintiffs' water 
rigths or the quality of their water (TR 63) and it is 
alleged in plaintiffs' complaint that ''The said property 
was purchased and has been maintained for the purpose 
of obtaining water from certain springs thereon'' (Com-
plaint page 3 paragraph 12). 
The property of the appealing defendants lies im-
mediately to the North or the plaintiffs' pipeline. The 
land of the defendants Ashby is about 275 feet in depth 
and about 523 feet in length, except, that prior to the fil-
ing of this action, the defendants Ashby had contracted to 
sell to one Mikesell a tract of land 92.8 feet in width and 
about 210 feet in depth, abutting on the highway to the 
South, and located substantially in the center of the Ashby 
property (TR 114). Mikesell was not made a party to 
the action although he was in possession at the time the 
suit was filed (TR 114). The only means of access which 
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the defendants haYe to the public highway running East 
and ''Test, South of the land in controversy, is across the 
one rod strip in question. 
The defendants Christensen o'vn a tract of land run-
ning 213.25 feet East and West and 119.6 feet in width 
lying i1n1nediately East of the Ashby property and abut-
ting on the narro"\v strip of land in controversy. Upon 
this land the Christensens built a home in 1949. They 
have lived there ever since (TR 96 and 97). They paid 
the taxes on their land, including that portion of the 
land in controversy extending in front of their home, for 
the year 1949. They must cross the one-rod strip of land 
in order to get to the public highway -on the South 
(TR 102). They have installed, and have used, outdoor 
sanitation facilities ever since they have been in posses-
sion of the property (TR 100). There is no testimony 
'vhatever that any use which the Christensens have made 
of the property has in any way tended to pollute the water 
source of the plaintiffs, or to interfere in any manner 
with the water right claimed by the plaintiffs. The 
conveyance from Ashbys to Christensens includes that 
part of the one-rod strip extending East and West, and 
lying South of the Christensen home. 
The principal issue in this case simmers down to the 
respective rights of the plaintiffs and the appealing de-
fendants in the narrow strip of land about a rod wide 
extending along the Southern boundary of the land 
owned by the appealing defendants Ashby and Christen-
sen. Obviously, there can be no issue as to the two rods 
which constitute a part of the public highway. There is 
no question but that the plaintiffs and their predecessors 
in interest have piped away certain drainage water over 
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a long period of years through the drainage pipe installed 
under the surface of the North boundary of the rod of land 
involved herein. There is, of course, included in this case 
the additional issue of use to be made of the land belong-
ing to the appealing defendants which lies entirely North 
of the pipeline. 
All the land referred to in the pleadings lies within 
the corporate limits of the city of Clearfield (TR 68). 
Prior to the time that the appealing defendants 
Ashby purchased their property in 1947, it had been 
used as a farm and orchard, except that part on the 
Southwest corner occupied by the residence and out-
buildings now belonging to Chester Ashby. There never 
has been a fence between the one rod strip and the 
property to the North. Over a period of years pigs, 
chickens, cattle and horses were kept on the property 
to the North in the near vicinity of the pipeline, and 
animals roamed at large over the property including 
the property in controversy (TR 34). 
The Ashbys and their predecessors in interest 
travelled East and West over the one rod strip to and 
from the orchard and other property lying to the East 
(TR 33; 145). 
Since the Ashby and Christensen property is now 
located in Clearfield City, its greatest value lies in its 
use for building lots and the construction of homes (TR 
113). Such use, of course, necessitates access to the 
public highway on the South. In order to get to that 
highway, it is necessary to cross the one-rod strip of 
land. 
The court in its findings found that the plaintiffs 
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and their predecessors in interest for 1nore than forty 
years had been the owners and in possession of, not 
only the one rod in question, but of that portion lying 
\rithin the public highway (Findings page 2 paragraph 
8). 'rhe court further found that the defendants Chris-
tensen, ''have no right, title or interest and no right 
to use the property clai1ned by the plaintiffs as a high-
way nor for a right of way in connection with the use 
of the property claimed'' by them (Findings of Fact 
page 8, paragraph 1). 
In the conclusions of law the court finds that the 
appealing defendants Ashby are entitled to a right of 
way for road purposes crossing the land in controversy 
'·at a point approximately one-half of the distance be-
tween the East and West point where the gate exists 
in the said fence." 
In the decree the court quieted the title of the plain-
tiffs in a tract of land 2¥2 rods in width and 50 rods in 
length. This tract includes half of the public road in use 
by the public generally since time immemorial. 
The court further decreed that all the appealing de-
fendants are ''permanently restrained from molesting 
or using the property in any manner contrary to. the 
deed dated February 6, 1907," and directing the de-
fendants ''to remove any and all items which may pol-
lute the water supply to a reasonable distance from said 
property." There are, however, no findings or con-
clusions as to what may pollute or what has polluted 
the water. 
In fact the court went ''all out'' and ignored the 
real provisions of the deed of 1907 reserving the right 
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of way across the land in controversy. 
The effect of the decree is to deprive the Christen-
sens of their right of way to the public road to the South; 
to prevent those who have purchased land to the North 
and East of the Christensens from using the road which 
they have heretofore used in gaining access to the public 
road to the South, and prevent the crossing of the strip 
of land in question at all except at a point approxi-
mately half way between the well and the East end of 
the strip described in the old Traugott deed. 'That ob-
viously means that the Christensens and those East and 
North of them find themselves completely land-locked. 
It also means that the defendants can not even travel 
East and West over the strip of land in question as they 
have always heretofore crossed it. It further means that 
it is impossible to make any other use of the defendants' 
land except for farming and that in one tract, because 
with any subdivision there must be a right of way across 
the strip in question for each owner. Clearly, the real 
effect of the court's decision is to land-lock the land of 
the appealing defendants so as to enable the plaintiffs 
to make defendants' property inaccessible and com-
paratively valueless. 
ST.._t\.TEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON FOR 
REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT 
The points relied upon by appellants for reversal of 
the judgment of the lower court are as follows: 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION OF 
·THE TRAUGOTT DEED (PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT B) IN 
THAT THE COURT PLACED AN UNWARRANTED AND 
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UNREASONABLE CONSTRUCTION UPON SAID DEED 
BY LIMITING THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE ONE 
ROD STRIP OF LAND TO A POINT NEAR THE CENTER 
OF THE ASHBY PROPERTY, AND EXCLUDING THE 
APPEALING DEFENDANTS FROM ACCESS TO AND 
FROM CROSSING SAID BORDER STRIP IN ANY 
OTHER MANNER WHATSOEVER. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DE-
FENDANTS CHRISTENSEN HAVE NO RIGHT OF WAY 
ACROSS OR RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE PREMISES 
COVERED BY THE TRAUGOTT DEED OF 1907. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING THE FOLLOW-
ING FINDINGS: No. 8 ON PAGE 2 OF ITS FINDINGS; 
No. 11 ON PAGE 3; No.1 ON PAGE 4; No.2 ON PAGE 
4, 5, AND 6; No.5 ON PAGE 7; No.1 ON PAGE 8; No.6 
ON PAGE 10; No.7 ON PAGE 10, BECAUSE SAID FIND-
ING ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING THE FOLLOW-
ING CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: No.1 ON PAGE 10 AND 
11 OF THE FINDINGS ·AND CO-NCLUSIONS; No. 2 
PAGE 11; No. 5 PAGE 11. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING THE DE-
FENDANTS TO REMOVE ANY AND ALL ITEMS 
WHICH MAY POLLUTE THE WATER SUPPLY TO A 
REASONABLE DISTANCE FROM THE SAID WATER 
SUPPLY WITHOUT FINDING WHICH ITEMS, IF ANY, 
EXISTING UPON ANY OF THE PROPERTY WILL OR 
MAY POLLUTE THE WATER SUPPLY. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RESTRAIN 
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PLAINTIFFS FROM BUILDING A FENCE OR OTHER 
OBSTRUCTIONS ALONG OR UPON THE ONE ROD 
STRIP OF LAND. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION OF 
THE TRAUGOTT DEED (PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT B) IN 
THAT THE COURT PLACED AN UNWARRANTED AND 
UNREASONABLE CONSTRUCTION UPON SAID DEED 
BY LIMITING THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE ONE 
ROD STRIP OF LAND TO A POINT NEAR THE CENTER 
OF THE ASHBY PROPERTY, AND EXCLUDING THE 
APPEALING DEFENDANTS FROM ACCESS TO AND 
FROM CROSSING SAID BORDER STRIP IN ANY 
OTHER MANNER WHATSOEVER. 
The proper approach to a question of this character 
is set forth in the case of Sakansky, et al, vs. W ein, 
et al, (N.H.) 169 Atl. 1. The court said: 
''In this state the respective rights of don1inant 
and servient owners are not determined by reference 
to some technical and more or less arbitrary rule 
of property law as expressed in some ancient maxim 
. . . but are determined by the rule of reason. The 
application of this rule raises a question of fact to 
be determined by consideration of all the surrounding 
circumstances, including the location and uses of both 
dominant and servient estates, and taking into con-
sideration the advantage to be derived by one and the 
disadvantage to be suffered by the other one. The 
rule is one of interpretation. Its office is either to 
give a meaning to words which the parties and their 
predecessors in title have actually used ... or else 
to give a detailed definition of rights created by 
general words actually used or whose existence is 
implied by law.'' 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The trial court appears to have considered 111ore than 
anything else the use to which the one rod strip next to 
the high,vay had been put by the various parties and their 
predecessors in interest for crop production. Little at-
tention was given to the right of way provisions of the 
deed or the use of the strip by the defendants for road 
purposes. Instead of construing the deed the court ap-
pears to have been guided by the thought that the law 
as applied to prescriptive rights was controlling. 
The law is well settled to the effect that "a right of 
way by grant derives no strength from time or occupancy . 
... c\. grant of yesterday is of equal validity to that of a 
century past and even though the way may never have 
been enjoyed, the grant is conclusive of the right.'' 17 
Am. J urs. 939, Section 26. 
A right of way created by express reservation in 
a conveyance stands upon the same basis as a grant. 
''A reservation of an easement in the deed by 
which the lands are covered is equivalent, for the 
purpose of the creation of the easement, to an ex-
press grant of the easement by the grantee of the 
lands." Brown et al. vs. Christopher et al, 67 Utah 
278, 247 Pac 503. 
''Thus, a right of way may be created by a 
reservation. It has been held that a reservation of 
an easement in the deed by which lands are conveyed 
is equivalent, for the purpose of the creation of the 
easement, to an express grant of the easement by 
the grant of the lands ... " 
''The general doctrine of reservation of ease-
nlents has been stated as follows: When it appears 
by the true construction of the terms of the grant 
that it was the well-understood purpose of the 
11 
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parties to create or reserve a right, in the nature 
of a servitude or easement, in the property granted, 
for the benefit of other land owned by the grantor, 
no matter in what for1n such purpose Inay be ex-
pressed, whether it is in the form of a condition, or 
covenant, or reservation, or exception, such right, 
if not against public policy, will be held to be ap-
purtenant to the land of the grantor and binding 
on that conveyed to the grantee, and the right and 
burden thus created and imposed will pass with the 
lands to all subsequent grantees; and any grantee 
of the land to which such right is appurtenant 
acquires, by his grant, a right to have the servitude 
easement, or right of amenity, as it is so1netin1es 
called protected in equity, notwiths~anding his right 
1nay not rest on a covenant which as a matter of 
law runs with the title to his land and notwith-
standing it may also be true that he may not be 
able to maintain an action at law for the vindication 
of his right." 17 Am. Jurs. page 942-943 Section 29. 
It was conceded, of course, by the plaintiffs in the 
trial of the case, that the defendants Ashby are entitled to 
a right of way for road purposes over the narrow strip 
of land covered by the Traugott deed. As a matter of 
fact, the plaintiffs relied in the trial of the case upon the 
Traugott deed to establish ownership of the property, and 
the controversy between the parties should have sim-
mered down to the construction of the Traugott deed~ 
The defendants conceded that the plaintiffs have the 
'vater rights contended for, but took the position that 
they (the plaintiffs) had the right to the unrestricted 
use of their land not within the Traugott deed, and the 
right to travel East and West as well as North and 
South over the narrow strip. 
The trial court took the position that the land on 
12 
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the North as it abuts on the narrow strip extending 
bet,veen the pipeline and the public road is entitled to 
but one point of access to the buffer strip, and that as a 
crossing North and South. Further1nore, the court took 
the position that when Ashby sold part of the land to 
Christensens that the latter obtained no right of access 
,vhatsoever to the narrow strip in question although 
Ashbys deeded to Christensens -the land lying between 
the Christensen home and the South quarter section line. 
It follows that any further tracts sold by Ashbys must 
go to the grantees without any right of access to the 
highway to the South if the decree stands. 
The narrow construction given by the trial court to 
the rights of the defendants cannot be justified. 
One having an easement by grant may assign that 
easement, and it goes to every portion of the dominate 
estate assigned, however many the tenants may be. 
Methodist Protestant Church vs. Laws 7 Ohio CC 21, 
4 Ohio CD 562. 
In the old but leading case of Hills vs Miller, 
2 Paige 245, 3 Am. Dec. 218, it is stated that ''as 
the right is annexed to the estate for the benefit of 
which the easement or servitude is created, the 
right is not destroyed by a division of the estate 
to which it is appurtenant. ·And the owner or as-
signee of any portion of that estate may claim the 
right so far as it is applicable to his part of the 
property, provided the right can be enjoyed as to 
the separate parcels without any additional charge 
or burden to the proprietor or the servient tena-
ment." 
It should be kept in mind that at the time of the origi-
nal grant of the right of way the dominant estate con-
13 
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sisted of all of the land immediately North of the narrow 
strip over which the right of way for road purposes was 
reserved, with other premises- 40 acres in all. Further-
more, we direct attention to the fact that where a reserva-
tion for right of way is made, the grantee in the deed is 
in effect the grantor against whom the provisions should 
be construed strictly since the reservation is really a grant 
for the benefit of the dominant tenement. In construing 
the Traugott deed this background must be considered. 
There is no evidence whatever that there was any 
established road way across the narrow strip at the time 
the reservation was made, nor is there any evidence to 
the effect that there is now an established road running 
East and West or North and South across the strip in 
question, except the Christensen road and one farther 
East. The only evidence is that there is a gate in the 
fence along the South side of the strip next to the canal 
and the public highway, and this was used by the Woods 
to gain access to their pipe line, and by Mikesell to whom 
Ashbys had contracted to sell a tract of land before the 
filing of the law suit. There never has been any defined 
''right of way for road purposes'' across the premises. 
There must, therefore, be a judicial determination 
of what is the real extent of defendandts' right of way. 
''In cases where the construction of a deed is 
in doubt the language should be construed favor-
ably to the Grantee. First Baptist soc. v. Wether-
all, 34 RI 155, 82 Atl. 1061; Gaddes vs. Pautucket 
Inst., for Sav., 4 RI 177, 80 Atl. 415, Ann Gas. 1913 
B 407. This rule of construction is not altered be-
cause the portion of the deed construed grants an 
easement 19 CJ 907, Section 94." Mateodo et al. 
vs. Capaldi et al. (RI) 138 Atl. 138, 53 ALR 550, 
14 
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at 552. 
''The detern1ination of the extent and nature 
of an easement granted or reserved in express 
terms by deed depends upon a proper construction 
of the language of the instrmnent, fron1 an exam-
ination of all the material parts thereof, and with-
out consideration of extraneous circun1stances, 
where the language is una1nbiguous. But as in the 
construction of deeds generally it is the duty of the 
court to ascertain and give effect to the intention of 
the parties, and for this purpose it may consider 
the situation of the property and of the parties, and 
the surrounding circumstances at the time the in-
strument was executed; also a practical construc-
tion of the instrument given by the parties them-
selves by their conduct or admission will be con-
sidered in determining the intent of the parties 
if the meaning of the instrument is doubtful. So 
in accordance \vith well settled principles govern-
ing conveyances generally, the grant must be 
taken 1nost strongly against the grantor in cases 
of doubt. '' 19 CJ p 907, Section 94. 
''A general right of way appurtenant to a tract 
of land, not limited in its scope by the terms of the 
grant, appertains to every portion of the tract, and 
upon a division of the land a right of way will exist 
in the owner of each of the lots into which it .may 
be divided. It is not limited to the purposes for 
which it was originally designed, but is available for 
any reasonable use to which the property is or may 
be put. Underwood v. Carney, 1 Cush, 285, 290; 
Whitney v. Lee, 1 Allen, 198, 79 Am. Dec. 727; }\ifil-
ler v. Washburn, 117 Mass. 371, 37 4; Moland v. 
St. John's Schools, 163 Mass. 229, 237, 39 N. E. 
1035; Fox v. Union Sugar Refinery, 109 Mass. 292, 
298; Parsons v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. 216 
Mass. 269, 273, 103 N. E. 693; Brookline v. Whid-
15 
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dren, 229 Mass. 485, 118 N. E. 981; Mahon v. Tully, 
245 Mass. 571, 57 6, 139 N. E. 797.'' 4 7 A.L.R. 901. 
"The mode in which an easement may be ex-
ercised is, in the case of an easement created by an 
express grant, determined by construction of the 
grant. The circumstances, however, under which 
the grant was made are to be considered in deter-
mining the construction of the grant. So it is gen-
erally a question of construction whether the ease-
ment is limited by the use made of the dominant 
tenement at the time of the grant, or whether the 
burden of the easement may be increased with any 
increase or change of use of the dominant 
tenement''. Tiffany Real Property 2 vols. in One 
Edition Sec. 321, pp 718-19. 
A grant of an easement may be ''construed as 
intended to convey an easement which shall apper-
tain to the dominant tenement, in spite of any 
changes, therein, and in such case the right to its 
exercise will not be affected by any such change. 
It is partly, perhaps, on this principle, that it is gen-
erally recognized that, upon the division of the 
dominant tenement by conveyance to different per-
sons, each of such grantees has the right to use the 
easement as it was before used by the owner of the 
entire tenement, without reference to whether this 
increases the burden on the servient tenement.'' 
Tiffany p 724 Section 323. 
The court's decision has the effect really of limiting-
the right of way so as to be beneficial to only one narrow 
tract, and of depriving the rest of land of the us~ of the 
way bestowed upon all parts of it under the Traugott 
grant. It also ignores the fact that the owners of the 
dominant tenement have always travelled East and West 
over the Wood strip for its full length. 
16 
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TESTI~IONY ON USE OF ONE ROD STRIP FOR 
RIGHT OF 'YAY PRIO·R TO FILING OF 
LAW SUIT 
:ill elvin G. Wood, one of the plaintiffs, testified as 
follows: 
'· Q Did you ever object to Mr. Clark or anyone 
else traveling over the land owned by you going East 
and West? 
''A You mean across it? 
'' Q In going East and West? 
''A Going into the farm and out of the farm they 
always went back and forth that way and used for 
their own. 
"Q And you never objected? 
"A No" (TR 87). 
Howard Hale , a witness called by the plaintiffs, 
testified as follows : 
'' Q Did you travel over the South part of the prop-
erty while you were working for Harrop? 
"A y . es, s1r. 
"Q You often travelled over that part of the prop-
erty? 
''A Whenever I had occasion to go over that way 
to look into the orchard. 
''Q The whole part of it? 
''A Well I never was over the whole thing. 
"Q You went anyv;here you wanted to go? 
17 
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"A That is right" (TR 33). 
Joyce Harrop, a witness called by the plaintiffs, 
testified as follows: 
'' Q Did you travel over the South portion of the 
property during the time you were there, or those repre-
sented by you, during that time did they travel over it? 
''A Part of it, yes. We went up through the or-
chard on it. 
'' Q You understood there was a right of way 
covering the whole thing, if you wanted to use it? 
''A Yes, that is the way we went back and forth 
to the orchard" (TR 145). 
In the face of this uncontradicted testimony of-
fered by plaintiffs, the court entered a decree barring 
all the defendants from travelling over the rod strip 
East and West, and from using said strip at all, except 
the decree permits Ashbys, and no one else, to cross 
North and South at one specified point (See Court's 
decree). 
To construe the grant across the wood strip now 
so as to limit the use of the right of way to one small 
ren1aining tract is in equitable and unsound. 
''The contention of the defendant that the 
way was confined to farming uses, and was 
limited to the purposes for which originally it 
was designed is unsound. The grant was of a 
general right of way. It is only where a right 
of way is acquired by prescription or is nar-
rowed by the terms of the grant to definite pur-
poses that the extent of the easement is restrict-
not by prescription, and is not limited in its 
18 
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scope by the tern1s of the grant, it is available 
for the reasonable uses to \vhich the do1ninant 
estate Inay be devoted." Parsons vs. N. Y. N.I-I. 
N.R. Co., 103 NE 693. 
In A1nerican Brass Con1pany YS. Serra, 132 Atl. 
656 at 566 the court said: ''The language of the deed 
indicates a grant of a right of way in general ter1ns. 
'A grant of a right of \vay in general tern1s will 
ordinarily be construed as creating a general right 
of \Yay eapable of use for all reasonable purposes.' 
2 Tiff on Real Property ( 2d Ed) p. 1332, Sec. 367.'' 
At page 567 of the same case the law is stated 
as follows : ''. . . This long-constinued nonuser by 
the owners of the don1inant tract of the easement 
of way created by grant did not extinguish it. As 
to the absence of a duty on the owner of the domi-
nant tract to use a way in order to maintain title to 
it, the law has been stated as follows : 
'A person who acquires title by deed to an ease-
ment appurtenant to land has the same right of prop-
erty therein as he has in the land and it is no more 
necessary that he should make use of it (the ease-
ment) to maintain his title than it is that he should 
actually occupy or cultivate the land. Hence his 
title is not affected by nonuser, and unless there is 
shown against him .... loss of title in some the ways 
recognized by law, he may rely on the existence of 
his property with full assurance that where oc-
casion arises for its use and enjoyment he -vvill find 
his rights therein absolute and unimpaired. Adams 
vs. Hodgkins 84A 530. '' 
Again at page 569: '' ... Minor and Wurtz on 
Real Property, Sec. 108, makes the following general 
statement of the law: 'An easement once created is 
not extinguished by the mere acts of the servient 
owner in themselves, however adverse they may be 
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to the enjoyment of the easement by the don1inant 
owner and however clearly they may indicate the 
desire and intention of the servient owner to put 
a stop to the use of his land. There must be added 
to these acts other circun1stances showing an inten-
tion on the part of the dominant owner to abandon 
or release the easement.' '' 
In Bowers et al. vs. Myers et al., 85 Atl. 860,. at 
861 the court held: ''. . . The authorities establish 
the proposition that a right of way expressed in gen-
eral terms is to be construed to include any reason-
able use to which it may be put. Thus, in Jones on 
Easements (1898) Sec. 375, it is said: "A right of 
way granted or reserved in general terms may be 
used for any purpose reasonably necessary for the 
party entitled to use it. The fact that the person ~n­
titled to such way has used it for one purpose only 
for a long series of years does not restrict its use 
to that purpose only. The grant being in general 
terms, it must be construed to include any reasonable 
use to which the land may be devoted.' '' 
In the case of Peck vs. Mackowsky, 82 Atl. Rep. 
199, the .grantor owned two pieces of land, only one 
of which bordered highway. In conveying a piece 
bordering- the highway he reserved ''for myself, my 
heirs and assigns forever a right of passway fron1 
the highway on the east to my land west of the rail-
road as now used.'' The remaining land was sub-
divided into two parts. The court states at p. 201 
''. . . It is clear that the easement of way so reserved 
was not a personal one, but one appurtenant to the 
25 acre tract of which Barber retained ownership. 
. . . As such, it attached to each and every part of 
that tract, and the benefit of it passed to the plain-
tiff, as a successor in title to Barber of the entire 
tract, and remains in him as the present owner of 
the 6 acre portion of it. 
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"For a deterntination of the character and 
extent of the easen1ent reserved by Barber, we n1ust 
look to the language of his deed, and, if that Ian-
guage is in any respect uncertain or ambiguous, 
then to that language as read in the light of the 
situation of the property and the surrounding cir-
cun1stances, to the end that the intention of the 
parties 1nay be ascertained and given effect .... 'In 
the construction of a deed or grant the language 
is to be construed in connection with, and in refer-
ence to, the nature and condition of the subject-
Inatter of the grant at the time the instrument is 
executed, and the obvious purpose the parties had 
in view.' Walker vs. Pierce, 38 Utah 9497 ... 'A 
right of \vay granted or reserved in general terms 
Inay be used for any purpose reasonably necessary 
for the party entitled to use it .... The grant being 
general in terms it must be construed to include any 
reasonable to use to which the land may be devoted.' 
Jones on Easements, Sec. 375.'' 
In Hewitt vs. Perry (Mass.) 34 N.E. 2d 489, 
at 491, the court said: " ... It is true that an ease-
ment granted in general and unrestricted terms is 
not limited to the uses made of the dominant estate 
at the time of its creation, but is available for the -
reasonable uses to which the dominant estate may 
be devoted. Parson vs. N. W., N.H. & N. Ry. 216 
Mass. 269, 7, 103N E. 693; Mahon vs. Tully, 245 
Mass. 571, 577, 139 N.E. 797. See also Rice vs. Vine-
yard Grove C,o., 270 Mass. 81, 169 N.E. 664. It may 
extend to the benefit of different parcels into which 
the dominant estate may be divided. Anzalone vs. 
Metropolitan District Commission, 257 Mass. 32, 36, 
153 N.E., 47 A.L.R. 897. Compare Baker vs. Wil-
lard, 171 Mass. 220, 227, 50 N.E. 620, 40 L.R.A. 
754, 68 Am St. Rep 445 ... '' 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DE-
FENDANTS CHRISTENSEN HAVE NO RIGHT OF WAY 
ACROSS OR RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE PREMISES 
COVERED BY THE TRAUGOTT DEED OF 1907. 
The effect of the court's ruling that the Christen-
sens have no right of access whatever to any part of 
the one-rod strip, extending in front of their premises, 
is to hold that where there is an express grant of a right 
of way inuring to the benefit of a large tract of land 
abutting on the property over which the right of way 
is to be enjoyed, and the owner or owners of the original 
dominant tenement deeds away to one or more grantees 
portions of the original dominant tenement that the 
servient tenement is relieved of the original servitude. 
That such a holding cannot be justified appears 
clearly from reason and from the authorities cited under 
POINT I. 
While there is no express mention of a right of way 
in the Christensen deed, yet Ashbys did execute and de-
liver to Christensens a warranty deed covering all of the 
one rod strip lying South of the Christensen premises 
(Defendants' Exhibit 3) and the Christensens thereupon 
began to use a right of way across the one rod strip 
as the only means of giving them access to the public 
highway to the South (TR 102). 
Easements appurtenant pass without mention in 
deed. Levine vs. Chintz (Ia) 8 NW2 735; Greenwalt 
vs. McCardell (Md.) 12 Atl. 2 522. 
There isn't any question but that a dominant tene-
ment may be sub-divided and sold without destroying 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the benefit of the ease1nent as to any part of land. 
"·It is a general rule where there is an ease-
Inent of \Yay appurtenant to a tenement, that the 
subsequent O\vner of such a tenement has the right 
of \vay as appurtenant to his particular part of the 
land.'' Beginning paragraph of annotation 8 
A.L.R. 1368 . 
.. A .. consideration of the nature of the one rod strip 
of land in question will indicate that standing alone it 
cannot be used to produce crops or for any other bene-
ficial purpose, except as a means of protecting the plain-
tiff's water supply. 
1\Ielvin G. vV ood, one of the plaintiffs, who is the 
1nayor of Clearfield, testified as follows : 
''Q You cannot use that little narrow tract, can 
you? 
''A I know it is very narrow. 
j 
' ' Q The only use you could make of it would be 
just to protect your water right? 
''A That is right. 
"Q That is the only use you have to make of it? 
"A That is right." (TR 87) 
It would, therefore, reasonably appear to have been 
the intention of the parties to the Traugott deed that 
the use of the strip of land in question was subject to 
unlimited use for road purposes travelling East and 
West as well as North and South, since the unlimited 
use for road purposes would not interfere with the pur-
pose for which the tract was conveyed to Wood, i.e., to 
obtain the underground water. 
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Loy Wood, one of the plaintiffs, testified as follows: 
'' Q You never used that for any purpose except in 
connection with the protection of your water there, is 
that right? 
"A That was it. 
"Q Your sole purpose there is to get the water and 
protect your water, isn't it, that is correct? 
''A That is correct. (TR 61) 
The one-rod strip has really remained as part of the 
tract to the North. 
Lottie Clark, awitness called by plaintiffs, testified 
as follows: 
'' Q Mrs. Clark do you ever remember any mark on 
the property by which you could distinguish where the 
South part that has been referred to as the Wood prop-
erty, and the North part are separated? 
"A I do not." (TR 42). 
There never has been a fence along the North side 
of the disputed strip, or any other fence except one to 
the South of the strip. 
Loy Wood, one of the plaintiffs, testified as follows: 
'' Q Talking about fences, when did you first under-
take to build a fence along the North line of the South 
part of the pToperty, the part shown on the map? 
''A The first time I ever tried to on the North side, 
last Spring, '49. 
'' Q Just prior to the beginning of the law suit is 
the first attempt you ever made to put a fence along 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
there? 
'• A That is the first time I ever tried to fence it. 
• · Q Then you undertook to put a fence up north 
of the well and you started east in that direction? 
''_A_ What was that? 
'· Q You atte1npted to start a fence North of the 
well? 
"'A \\T e followed the line given by the surveyor. 
'' Q Including the one-half rod to the North? 
''A Not including the one-half rod. 
'' Q How far did you get with your fence? 
"A I think half-way up with the posts. 
'' Q Did you put that along the pipe line or along 
the half rod that is North of the pipe line? 
"A We put it along the pipe line. 
'' Q That is the first time since 1907 you ever 
attempted to build a fence along the North line? 
"A That is the first time." (TR 59-60). 
Melvin G. Wood, one of the plaintiffs testified as 
follows: 
"Q Up to this time there never has been any mark 
running East and West across the land indicating the 
South part that your claim is to separate it from the 
part to the North. 
''A No sir, there has been no fence posts to show 
vvhere it was to go. 
'' Q If we go on the land now, there is nothing ob-
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vious to indicate that to an individual, is there? 
"A No." (TR 92). 
Under that statement of facts, coupled with the other 
facts hereinbefore referred to, we submit the court erred 
in barring Christensens from buffer strip completely. 
POINT III 
THE c·oURT ERRED IN ENTERING THE FOLLOW-
ING FINDINGS: No. 8 ON PAGE 2 OF ITS FINDINGS; 
No. 11 ON PAGE 3; No.1 ON PAGE 4; No.2 ON PAGE 
4, 5, AND 6; No.5 ON PAGE 7; No.1 ON PAGE 8; No.6 
ON PAGE 10; No.7 ON PAGE 10, BECAUSE SAID FIND-
ING ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
It is submitted that finding No. 8 on page 2 of the 
COURT'S FINDINGS is not supported by the evidence 
since the finding sets it forth as a fact that the plaintiffs 
and their predecessors in interest now are and for the 
last 40 years have been the owners and in possession of 
the strip of land in question. While there isn't any evi-
dence but that the plaintiffs have an interest in said land, 
neither is there any doubt but that the defendants are 
entitled to free access to the said property. 
The court erred in entering that part of finding 11 
in which it is found that the defendants Ashby within a 
year of the filing of the action either moved upon or per-
mitted others to move upon the strip of land in question 
certain pig pens. It appears conclusively from the evi-
dence that the Ashbys at the time of the complaint were 
living in the State of Idaho, and knew nothing about the 
pig pens complained of (TR 109-110; TR 118), and 
there is no claim Christensens knew anything about 
the matter. The only person who could have been respon-
sible was C. R. Ashby, against whom the action was dis-
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1ni~sed. Neither is there any evidence that the Ashbys 
cut any holes 'vhatever in the fence to the South. 
The court further erred in entering the 2nd para-
graph of finding 1 on page 4 in that it is not supported 
by the evidence. 
The court further erred in entering those parts of 
its findings No. 2 on page 4, 5, and 6 of the court's 
findings in which the court found that the defendants 
have not gro,vn crops upon the strip of land in question. 
The court further erred in entering its finding No. 5 
on page 7 to the effect that the plaintiffs are entitled to 
have their title to said property quieted as against the 
defendants and that the defendants are entitled to no 
relief under their counterclaim. The evidence shows the 
plaintiffs have an undisputed interest in the land in ques-
tion. 
The court further erred in entering its findings No.1 
on page 8 in which it is found that the plaintiffs have been 
in undisputed possession of the property in question for 
many years, and where it further found that the answer-
ing defendants ''have no right, titled or interest and no 
right to use the property claimed by the plaintiffs as a 
highway or a right of way to use the property as claimed 
in the defendants separate answer". Said finding is di-
rectly in the teeth of the plaintiffs own evidence. ( TR 
87; TR 33; TR 145; TR 86). 
The court further erred in entering its findings No. 
6 and No. 7 on page 10 because said findings are not 
supported by the evidence. 
It appears from the argument, and from the authori-
ties set forth under Points I and II that it is erroreous to 
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find that the plaintiffs have been "in open, notorius, ad-
verse, hostile, uninterrupted, peaceable, continuous, ex-
clusive, unmolested and undisputed possession of said 
property", and that the plaintiffs are entitled to have 
their title quieted to all of the property lying South of the 
pipe line to the entire exclusion of the Christensens from 
any easements therein and to the exclusion of the defend-
ants Ashby except to the limited pin-point crossing North 
and South at a designated point . 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING THE FOLLOW-
ING CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: No.1 ON PAGE 10 AND 
11 OF THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS; No. 2 
PAGE 11; No. 5 PAGE 11. 
The court erred in entering conclusion No. 1 on 
pages 10 and 11 because said conclusions definitely are 
against the evidence and definitely against the law ap-
plicable to the case as set forth in Points 1 and 2, be-
cause the Ashbys are entitled to travel East and West 
as well as North and South across the premises in ques-
tion and to have the premises unenclosed and open to 
acce~s, and the Christensens are entitled to their ease-
ment over the property south of the pipe line because 
they are the owners of part of the land for the benefit 
of which the easement in question was created. This 
position is sustained by the evidence and by the law as 
hereinbefore set forth. 
The court further erred in entering its conclusion 
No. 2 on Page 11 in which it finds that the defendants 
should be permanently restrained from using the strip 
of land in question in any manner contrary to the deed 
dated February 6th, 1907, without construing the said 
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deed and by concluding that all items which pollute the 
\Vater supply should be re1noved "\vithout designating 
any iteins \vhich, as a n1atter law, have polluted or \viii 
pollute the \Yater. The court further erred in concluding 
that the counterclaim of the defendants Ashby should 
be disnussed because the said defendants are entitled 
to affirmative equitable relief fixing their rights to use 
the strip of land in question traveling East and West 
and North and South, and restraining the plaintiffs, and 
each of them, fron1 interferring wifh the exercise of the 
rights of the defendants in the strip in question. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING THE DE-
FENDANTS TO REMOVE ANY AND ALL ITEMS 
WHICH MAY POLLUTE THE WATER SUPPLY TO A 
REASONABLE DISTANCE FROM THE SAID WATER 
SUPPLY WITHOUT FINDING WHICH ITEMS, IF ANY, 
EXISTING UPON ANY OF THE PROPERTY WILL OR 
MAY POLLUTE THE WATER SUPPLY. 
On page 2 of the decree a permanent injunction is 
entered restraining the appealing defendants ''from 
1nolesting or using said property in any manner contrary 
to the deed dated February 6th, 1907, and requiring the 
defendants to remove any and all items which may pol-
lute the water supply to a reasonable distance from said 
property.'' 
There is no finding anywhere to the effect that at the 
time of the trial of the case there was any" ite:r;n" of any 
kind upon the stri~ of land in question which could pol-
lute or which had polluted the water. The provisions, 
therefore, are so uncertain and indefinite that no one can 
determine what the court had in mind. Neither is there 
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any evidence in the records that any of the _appealing 
defendants at any time ever did any act that could 
pollute the water. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RESTRAIN 
. PLAINTIFFS FROM BUILDING A FENCE OR OTHER 
OBSTRUCTIONS ALONG OR UPON THE ONE ROD 
STRIP OF LAND. 
It appears positively from the records that the 
answering defendants, and each of them, have the right 
to use the strip of land in question for right of .way pur-
poses, and that they have the right of access to said 
strip at any point to travel either East and West or 
North and South, and that the plaintiffs should, there-
fore, be restrained and enjoined from placing fences or 
other obstructions upon or along the tract in question 
to prevent its use by the defendants. The court's decree 
all the way through treats the land in question as the 
absolute property of the plaintiffs, open only to the plain-
tiffs, while the defendants are in effect treated as tres-
passing strangers. If the decree is permitted to stand 
as entered, the plaintiffs will be free to carry out their 
intentions and build a fence along the pipe line, and main-
tain a deep trench along the North of the strip, which 
trench they have constructed since the filing of this 
action. 
The decision of the court can lead only to confusion ....... .. 
and repeated misunderstanding. It permits the plain-
tiffs to act as ''dogs in the manger'' and take over 
exclusive possession of the strip of right-of-way land in 
question, while denying access to the strip to the de-
fendants for a right of way for the property to the North. 
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This is in the teeth of the fact that it is conceded that 
the unlimited use of the strip for right of 'vay purposes 
cannot and will not interfere 'vith the only use it was 
intended for the plaintiffs to n1ake of the buffer strip 
of land. The decree is unjust and inequitable, and is in 
contravention of a reasonable and fair interpretation 
of the Traugott deed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is the contention of the defendants that this is 
a case in which the equitable construction of the Trau-
gott deed definitely requires that the court take into 
consideration not along the bare wording of t~e deed, 
but the extraneous facts which must have been con-
sidered by the parties to the instrument. Obviously, a 
one rod strip of land extending between a large tract 
and a public high,vay would not be intended by the 
parties as a means of permitting the grantee to land-
lock the owner of the dominant estate who reserved a 
right of way for road purposes over the narrow strip. 
We submit that the conduct of the parties in per-
mitting the land constituting the narrow strip to remain 
part of the larger area for all practical purposes, except 
such use as would interfere with the plaintiffs under-
ground water, indicates that from the beginning the right 
of unrestricted access to the strip was intended to be con-
ferred upon the owners of the land to the North. 
We respectfully sub1nit that the defendants are 
entitled to make the most beneficial use of their premises, 
and that they are not limited to use the land for farming. 
We further submit that it is inequitable to construe the 
rights of the parties so that the Christensens are de-
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barred of any right of access whatever to the public high-
way, and from any access whatever to the right-of-way 
strip. 
We further submit that the decree of the lower court 
must be reversed and changed so as to enjoin the plain-
tiffs from interfering with the rights of the defendants 
in their access to the strip reserved for a right of way. 
· In substance, it is necessary that the Supreme 
Court place an equitable construction upon the situation 
in the light of the entire background coupled with deed. 
We submit that the decree of the lower court should 
be reversed and a judgment entered in keeping with the 
equities of the situation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILSON AND WILSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
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